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Nontechnical Summary 
 
Over the last decade, environmental (green) taxes on energy or emissions have played a growing role in 
environmental policies of OECD countries. As a common feature of green tax schemes, tax rates are 
differentiated across polluters: Taxation typically discriminates in favor of energy-intensive industries including, 
as an extreme case, complete tax exemptions. The lack of a stronger efficiency rationale for such a policy design 
provides the motivation for our political-economy analysis, which assesses the role of interest groups in 
environmental tax differentiation both theoretically and empirically.  
Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data 
from the German Ecological Tax Initiative. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, in our 
model tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but 
also by the groups’ interest in revenue rebates to labor. We demonstrate that sectors with good opportunities to 
substitute energy use will ceteris paribus be expected to face higher taxes in a political-economy setting, and 
have lower incentives to lobby for tax reductions. Benefits from lobbying are largest for sectors with highly 
inelastic energy use: On efficiency grounds, such sectors would be assigned high taxes as they are less 
distortionary than in other sectors. The resulting high costs from taxation, however, lead to high lobbying 
incentives which in turn can translate into substantially reduced taxes. 
A regression analysis of Germany’s green tax reform shows that environmental tax differentiation is consistent 
with political-economy reasoning. Underpinning our theoretical predictions, both economic characteristics of 
industries and political interests determine the design of the tax scheme. The reform clearly discriminated in 
favor of industries represented by more powerful lobbies, in particular those with highly inelastic emissions use. 
The success in lobbying depends, e.g., on market concentration, the level of international competition, and 
employment levels. However, in general these issues only become relevant when lobby groups put them on the 
political agenda as arguments against environmental taxation. This complements the findings from the literature 
that tax differentiation can hardly be justified on efficiency grounds: Only in a political-economy context, the 
potential arguments in favor of differentiation become effective. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, environmental (green) taxes on energy or emissions have played a growing role in 
environmental policies of OECD countries. As a common feature of green tax schemes, tax rates are 
differentiated across polluters: Taxation typically discriminates in favor of energy-intensive industries including, 
as an extreme case, complete tax exemptions (OECD 2001).  
While textbook economics suggests uniform taxes to internalize environmental externalities, market 
imperfections or distortions are potential reasons why sectorally differentiated taxes might be desirable under 
efficiency considerations. Environmental tax differentiation may for example attenuate the inefficiencies of 
existing (fiscal) taxes and labor market rigidities (see, e.g., Richter and Schneider 2003) and alleviate the 
negative effects from leakage, i.e. increased transboundary pollution from non-abating countries (Hoel 1996). 
Accounting for market power of large open economies, differentiated environmental taxes may also be enacted 
to change terms-of-trade against trading partners (“beggar-thy-neighbor” policy – see, e.g., Krutilla 1991, 
Anderson 1992, Rauscher 1994).   
Surprisingly, quantitative evidence to back these theoretical arguments is rather scant. Drawing on simulations 
with a computable general equilibrium model based on empirical data, Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) 
conclude “that there is little economic rationale for the common policy practice of discriminating strongly in 
favor of heavy industries, even when accounting for interacting taxes, leakage, and international market power.“ 
Indeed, Babiker et al. (2000) and Kallbekken (2004) identify large welfare costs from differentiating climate 
policy by sector: studying realistic differentiation scenarios, they find that costs of reaching a certain emission 
target can easily double compared to an efficient implementation.  
The lack of a stronger efficiency rationale provides the motivation for our analysis. This paper assesses the role 
of interest groups in environmental tax differentiation both theoretically and empirically.  
Positive theories on the role of interest groups in policy formation use various alternative models to study 
political determinants of environmental policy.1 Our theoretical approach uses a common-agency problem in the 
tradition of Grossman and Helpman (1994): Interest groups can influence decisions of policy makers by means 
of donations to election campaigns. While political-economy determinants of environmental tax design have 
been studied before (see Frederiksson 1997 and Aidt 1997, 1998 on the role of international competition on the 
tax level and the role of tax rebates in a revenue-neutral tax reform), we provide, to our knowledge, the first 
combined theoretical and empirical analysis on political-economy effects on tax differentiation. 
We demonstrate that sectors with good opportunities to substitute energy use will (i) ceteris paribus be expected 
to face a higher tax in a political-economy setting, and (ii) have lower incentives to lobby for tax reductions. 
Benefits from lobbying is largest for sectors with highly inelastic energy use: While it is efficient to assign high 
                                                 
1 An overview is given by Oates and Portney (2003). Rent-seeking models describe how interest groups compete 
for group-specific rents (Tullock 1980), specifically in the context of environmental instrument choice 
(Dijkstra 1998). In Probabilistic-voting models lobby groups exert influence on the policy maker through the 
potential, yet uncertain votes of their members (Coughlin 1992). Models of information transfer are based on 
exchange of true information between interest groups and policy maker, on which the politician bases her 
decisions (Grossman and Helpman 2001, Naedval and Brazee 2000, Potters and van Winden 1992). 
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taxes on inelastic factors, the resulting high costs from taxation induce large lobbying incentives and are 
predicted to lead to substantially reduced tax levels for sectors with inelastic energy use. 
Our results from an empirical analysis of the German Ecological Tax Reform are consistent with these 
predictions. The reform clearly discriminated in favor of industries represented by more powerful lobbies, in 
particular those with highly inelastic emissions use. The effect of lobbying on the resulting tax rates depends on 
energy demand elasticities, employment levels or the level of international competition. This result complements 
the findings from the literature mentioned above that tax differentiation can hardly be justified on efficiency 
grounds: Only in a political-economy context, the potential arguments in favor of differentiation become 
effective. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a common-agency model to derive 
differentiated environmental taxes under political-economy considerations. In section 3, we present a regression 
analysis for green taxation in Germany, which to our knowledge provides a first quantitative assessment of the 
role of interest groups in environmental tax differentiation. In section 4, we conclude.  
 
 
2 A political-economy model of differentiated green taxes 
 
We study a common-agency model of a small open economy to analyze political-economy motivations to 
differentiate environmental taxes. The model is in the tradition of Aidt (1998) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1994). The desire of some sectors to avoid costs due to taxation affects the policy choice of a government 
(regulator) which is not only interested in overall welfare but also values contributions (support) by the different 
interest groups. 
We consider an economy with ns ,...,1=  sectors and a representative consumer who earns all the labor income 
and holds all the profit shares of the firms. In the production sectors, competitive firms produce output by using 
labor ls, energy (emissions) es and some other inputs (capital) which we do not explicitly model here. Output qs 
of sector s is produced via a concave production function ( , )s s sf e l  and can be sold at world market sp .2 To 
simplify the exposition of our results, we assume that the production decisions on labor and energy are separable, 
i.e. 2 / ( , ) 0s s sf e l e l∂ ∂ ∂ = . Further, energy has to be imported from the world market at unit costs z .  
The German ecological tax reform lifted burdens on labor by taxing energy use. Reflecting this feature, we 
assume that the regulator taxes emissions (energy use) at a rate sτ  such that firms face unit costs of energy 
(emissions) s sz z τ= + . For the wage rate which is identical for all sectors, we follow Bovenberg and Ploeg 
                                                 
2 With this formulation, we implicitely assume a competitive world market such that we do not have to consider 
consumption choices and consumer surplus in the domestic market. More generally, a sector could face a 
downward sloping demand if no (perfect) substitutes are produced by producers abroad. We will discuss the 
effects of such a generalization at a later stage in this paper.  
 3
(1996) in assuming that labor supply is rationed by an exogenous employees wage ew . Energy taxes are used to 
reduce the tax wedge between employee and producer wage pw  The effective producer wage is therefore given 
by pw w σ= −  where σ  will be endogenously determined by the tax yield.  
In modeling the ecological tax reform, we assume that the regulator taxes emissions in order to achieve an 
aggregate target of 
ss
E e=∑ .      (1) 
As the tax reform is revenue-neutral, the tax yield will be used to reduce the social security taxes on labor such 
that the reduction of social security burdens σ  is determined by. 
s s ss s
l eσ τ=∑ ∑       (2) 
Note that with this setting, profits of the respective sectors are given by  
( , ) ( ) ( )ss s s s s s p sp f e l z e w lπ τ σ= − + − − .     (3) 
Social welfare is given by:3
 [ ( ) ]e s s s s p e ss s sW w l e w w lπ ψ τ σ= + + + − −∑ ∑ ∑    (4) 
where 1ψ ≥  denotes the marginal costs of public revenue. 
Depending on the policy chosen by the government, the production decisions by competitive profit-maximizing 
firms are given by the following well-known first-order conditions: 
( , )      ( , )s ss e s s s s l s s pp f e l z p f e l wτ σ= + = −     (5) 
which leads to  
      s ss s
s
d de l
d d
π π
τ σ= − =      (6) 
 
2.1 Political interests 
The government chooses the tax/rebate system ( , )sτ σ  in order to implement its environmental goal 
ss
E e=∑ . Hereby, the rebate is implicitly determined by the tax system and guarantees revenue-neutrality: 
s s ss s
l eσ τ=∑ ∑ . In designing the policy, the government does not only care about social welfare but 
additionally takes contributions (( ) )s t tT τ  (support) by sectoral lobby groups into account. We assume that there 
is a lobby group for each sector s. The value which the government attaches to contributions from lobby groups 
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might differ across sectors, i.e. interest groups might differ with respect to their effectiveness in lobbying. The 
weight which contributions by the lobby groups of the respective sectors receive is denoted by sλ . 
Taking the support by the respective lobby groups into account, the objective of the government is to maximize  
(( ) ) (( ) ) (( ) )t t t t s s t tsG W Tτ τ λ τ= +∑     (7) 
Before the government decides upon the tax rates, each lobby group offers a menu of campaign contributions 
depending on the chosen policy (( ) )s t tT τ  in order to optimally influence the profits in its sector (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1986). In our analysis we concentrate on the equilibrium which is given by each lobby group (locally) 
truthfully reporting their costs and benefits form the respective policy (existence shown, e.g., in Grossman and 
Helpman 1994, Aidt 1998). Each contribution schedule (( ) )s t tT τ  is hence given by the sectoral profits sπ  less 
a constant. 
The optimization problem (7) of the government therefore is to maximize 
(( ) ) (( ) ) (( ) )t t t t s s t tsG Wτ τ λ π τ= +∑      (8) 
by choosing ( )t tτ  and σ  subject to (1) and (2).4  
Using the firms’ first-order conditions (5) and (6) and denoting the Lagrange multipliers for (1) and (2) by 1μ  
and 2μ , we obtain the following first-order conditions: 
20 ( 1) ( ) ( )[ ]s s e p es
G L L Ll w w w Lλ ψ ψ μ σσ σ σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = + + + − − + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑   (9) 
and 
1 20 ( 1) ( )[ ]s ss s s s
s s s
e eG e eλ μ ψ μ ττ τ τ
∂ ∂∂= = − + − + + +∂ ∂ ∂    (10) 
where ssL l=∑  and ssE e=∑ .  
Conditions (9) and (10) determine the optimal differentiation of taxes and  can be rewritten as: 
 
2 21 / [ ( ) ( ) ] /s s e p es
Ll L w w w Lμ ψ λ ψ ψ μ σ σ
∂+ − = + + − − + ∂∑   (11) 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 As we assume that the aggregate emission target E  is fixed in our analysis, we can disregard the 
environmental impact of emissions which, clearly, are the motivation to pursue the reform in the first place. 
4 Equivalently to modeling contributions by the lobby groups, this objective function resembles the welfare in 
which different sectors receive different weights. This can be due to different political connections between 
government and sectors. In Germany, for example, much of the labor force in the coal industry was organized 
in labor unions which traditionally had strong linkages to the Social Democrats which lead the government 
when the ecological tax reform was introduced.  
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21
2 2
1
/
s s
s
s s
e
e
ψ μ λμτ ψ μ ψ μ τ
+ − −= −+ + ∂ ∂     (12) 
We use these two conditions to discuss the impact of lobbying on the differentiation of taxes.  
 
2.2 The impact of interest groups 
First observe that if there is no political power of interest groups, 0sλ =  for all s, then  
 
2 21 [ ( ) ( ) ] /e p e
Lw w w Lμ ψ ψ ψ μ σ σ
∂+ − = + − − + ∂    (11’) 
 
1 2
2 2
1
/
s
s
s s
e
e
μ ψ μτ ψ μ ψ μ τ
+ −= −+ + ∂ ∂     (12’) 
In this case, condition (12’) implies that taxes will be differentiated because of a “tax yield” effect. This effect, 
2
2
1
/
s
s s
e
e
ψ μ
ψ μ τ
+ −− + ∂ ∂ , causes taxes to be higher in sectors with relatively inelastic emissions. This term 
thereby corresponds to a standard Ramsey-formula. Only if tax generation does not cause social costs ( 1ψ = ) 
and the revenue neutrality constraint is not binding ( 2 0μ = ), no differentiation due to tax generation results.  
Lobby activities by a sector s are targeted at reducing the net payments of taxes, s s se lτ σ− . It is clear, that – 
ceteris paribus – energy-intensive sectors face higher effective costs than labor-intensive sectors. Although 
conditions (11’) and (12’) show that differences in energy and labor intensities across sectors alone do not induce 
differentiated taxes, we can decompose the net tax payments in energy taxes and rebates on labor to discuss the 
impact of lobbying via two different channels: First, the sectoral lobby group wants to reduce its own tax rate 
sτ . Second, as there will be a rebate according to the labor input in the sector, lobbies are interested in a higher 
rebate slσ  which can only be obtained by an increase in aggregate tax revenues. Both effects can be seen from 
equation (11) and (12) as we will show in turn.  
The first channel can be seen from partially differentiating the tax rate sτ  with respect to sλ  which gives a 
negative derivative: 
2
1/ 0
/
s
s s
s s
e
e
τ λ ψ μ τ∂ ∂ = <+ ∂ ∂ . Consequently, even if there is no restriction on the 
revenue-neutrality ( 2 0μ = ) and 1ψ = , differentiated taxes will result because of lobby activities. More 
effective lobbying results in a reduced tax rate. This effect of lobbying on the tax rate is the more pronounced, 
the less elastic emissions in the sector are, i.e., the less substitutable energy use is (condition (12)). Intuitively, 
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given equal lobby power sλ , sectors which can hardly abate emissions by shifting production patterns will end 
up with a smaller emissions tax than sectors which can reduce emissions and thereby tax payments rather easily. 
The second channel is created by linking the ecological tax with rebates on labor use. Adding to the complexity 
of lobbying activities, firms with interest in large rebates must lobby for a larger total tax yield.5 This interest in 
increasing the total tax yield is represented by the positive derivative of 2μ  with respect to sλ : 
2 / /[ / ] 0s s
Ll Lμ λ σσ
∂∂ ∂ = + >∂ . The effect a sector has in lobbying for the higher tax yield is the larger, the 
larger the labor use in this sector is and, hence, the larger the expected rebate of the tax yield is. The resulting 
effect on the tax rate can be seen from (12): Here we obtain 2
2
1/
/ 1
s
s s
s
s
s s
e e
e
τ ττ μ τ μ
∂ +∂∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ +  which is 
positive if and only if an increase in the tax rate sτ  increases the aggregate tax yield.  
 
2.3 Explaining the lobby weight of interest groups 
The lobby weight of the respective interest groups can clearly not directly be observed in the real world. Olson 
(1965) develops a theory to explain the formation and the power of interest groups. In particular the group size 
matters: If the number of firms in a sector is large, a smaller degree of organization can be expected unless this 
sector is dominated by only a smaller number of big firms, i.e., the level of concentration is large. These general 
characteristics of a sector can be expected to determine lobby activities of these sectors in all policy fields and 
thus can be used as proxy in the empirical analysis.  
In addition to these general determinants, the formation of interest groups is affected by the stakes which are on 
the table. For the policy field of an ecological tax reform, our model therefore yields specific predictions on the 
lobby weights as stakes differ substantially across sectors: In general, all sectors are interested in an increase in 
the rebate on labor and shift of the tax burden from them to other sectors. In particular sectors with a large labor 
force favor an increasing aggregate tax yield without being burdened themselves. However, as taxes and tax 
yield are interdependent, predictions depend on the impact of sectoral tax rates on the tax yield. 
We first consider sectors with highly inelastic emissions. From condition (12) we see that if such sectors lack 
lobby power ( 2 1sλ ψ μ< + − ), they will be burdened with a huge emissions tax as taxing them in order to 
generate tax yield is less distortionary than taxing sectors with elastic demand. If, however, such a sector with 
inelastic emission use is highly effective in lobbying ( 2 1sλ ψ μ> + − ) it will face only a small emissions tax 
since otherwise its tax burden would be huge as it cannot reduce it by shifting production patterns. The 
incentives to lobby for sectors with inelastic emissions use are therefore large, in particular if they are highly 
                                                 
5 In a more general model, one clearly could introduce differentiated rebate rates for the sectors. In such a case, 
lobbies could directly target their specific rebate. In order to be close to the German tax reform , however, we 
do not consider this additional policy instrument variable. 
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energy-intensive.6 We can therefore expect such sectors to form a lobby group to avoid taxes. These sectors 
might only support an ecological tax reform if they are granted large exemptions and are labor-intensive and 
would therefore benefit from tax rebates. 
Lobbying activities by sectors with highly elastic emissions use, however, have only a small effect on the 
resulting tax rate (condition (12)). The reason is that they can easily reduce tax payments by changing their 
production activities. These sectors have therefore only small incentives to lobby for tax reductions. They can be 
expected to support the ecological tax reform the more, the larger their labor force is, i.e., the larger their 
expected benefit from reducing social security payments on labor.  
 
2.4 The role of international competition 
In our model we have assumed that all sectors face an exogenously given output price at which firms can sell 
their products. In general, however, firms face international competition to different degrees. As foreign 
competitors are not subject to taxation, the competitiveness of domestic firms is decreased by the environmental 
taxes which, at the margin, might lead to firm-closures and relocation. Considering these potential effects on 
firms and workforce, the regulator might want to discriminate taxes in favor of those sectors which face strong 
international competition. 
 
2.5 Summary of theoretical predictions  
Using our simple theoretical model, we can summarize predictions on the role of lobbying on environmental 
taxes:7 
• Without lobbying, emission taxes are differentiated if (i) they replace distortionary taxes (marginal 
costs of social funds >1), (ii) sectors face different degrees of international competition or (iii) sectors 
feature different degrees of emissions elasticity. 
• Lobbying leads to a differentiation of environmental taxes. Increased lobbying in a sector leads to 
reduced taxes.  
• Lobbying is most beneficial for sectors with inelastic emissions such that we should expect the 
formation of lobby groups as well as reduced tax rates particularly in those sectors. 
• Labor intensive sectors which get a substantial rebate will benefit from the tax reform. 
In the next section, we put these predictions to a test using a regression analysis of the German Ecological Tax 
Initiative. 
 
                                                 
6  The cement industry provides a frequently cited example for an energy-intensive sector with few possibilities 
to substitute. Here, stakes are accordingly substantial. 
7  It should be noted that in our model we assume that the ecological target of the tax reform is fixed. That is, a 
lower burden for one sector results in increased burdens for others. In reality, however, the regulator can quite 
often compromise on the ecological goal in order to increase the approval for the policy instrument as such. 
The emission level which results in such a setting, could then be taken as input in our model. 
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3 Regression analysis of the German Ecological Tax Reform 
 
Between 1999 and 2003 Germany implemented a green tax reform with the goal of obtaining a “double 
dividend”, i.e. reducing energy-related emissions and increasing employment. The reform levied higher taxes on 
energy use while recycling the additional energy tax yield through a reduction of employer’s social security 
contributions. A central feature of Germany’s green tax reform, which can be generalized to green tax reforms in 
other OECD countries (OECD 2001), are substantial energy tax breaks for energy-intensive firms (Böhringer 
and Schwager 2003). In our regression analysis, we aim at identifying central determinants of German green 
taxation. The estimations will provide an empirical assessment of the theoretical role of interest groups in 
environmental tax differentiation as laid out in section 2.  
 
3.1 Data and variables 
The cross-sectional regression analysis covers all 42 manufacturing sectors of the German economy as provided 
by the official input-output classification (see Table 1 of the Appendix for a list of sectors). The basis of our 
empirical analysis is a sector level data set for Germany, which was compiled from various sources.8 We 
collected data on lobby representatives of German industrial associations by a telephone survey of the respective 
organizations. For statistical consistency, we made a couple of choices regarding the relevant years of 
observation: Energy use, taken from 1998, served as a base for the design of the reform which was determined 
by the German government in 1999. Net burdens as well as energy tax rates in the year 2003 represent the final 
tax levels after a yearly, stepwise increase since 1999, the year in which they were politically determined. 
Employees of German industrial associations in 1995 reflect the fact that the political debate about the 
Ecological Tax Initiative reached its climax already in the mid-1990s. For the same reason, price elasticities of 
energy use as well as production and employment as important issues of the political debate are taken from this 
period, and estimates of politically relevant Armington elasticities are based on time-series data ending in 1990. 
Due to data availability, market concentration is observed in 2001. Consequently, the chosen time lag between 
the years of observation of tax rates and major explanatory variables assures that a potential problem of 
endogeneity (environmental taxation may have an effect on independent variables, e.g., on energy use) is 
attenuated. 
As dependent variables we employ the three tax components of the reform: the average effective tax rates for 
electricity, gas and fuel oil (i.e., rates including reductions), as well as the net burden (the overall tax reform 
burden). These are structural variables reflecting the sectorally differentiated character of the tax initiative. As in 
our theoretical analysis, we will generally focus on the tax rate which was central to the actual political debate. 
The explanatory variables reflect political-economy determinants of environmental tax differentiation: lobbying 
power, market concentration and the exposure to international competition. We furthermore control for central 
                                                 
8 Data on sectoral energy use, tax rates and net burdens was provided by the German Institute of Economic 
Research (see Bach et al. 2003, 2001). Sectoral production and employment data are taken from offical input-
output tables, and data on sector-specific price elasticities of energy demand is based on Capros et al. (1999). 
Market concentration data stems from the German Monopolies Commission (German Monopolies 
Commission 2004a, 2004b). Estimates of Armington elasticities are taken from an econometric analysis by 
Welsch (2004). 
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objectives and implementation features of the green tax reform by introducing the following regressors: energy 
intensities (energy use per production value), sectoral employment levels, and price elasticities of fuel demand 
(an overview of all regression variables is provided in Table 2 of the Appendix; summary statistics for the 
variables are given in Table 3 of the Appendix). Finally, we incorporate various interaction terms in order to 
infer how the effect of one explanatory variable depends on the magnitude of other explanatory variables. 
As a measure for lobbying power or effectiveness we employ the number of lobby employees for the 
representative industrial association in each sector (see Table 4 of the Appendix for a mapping between sectors 
and respective associations): According to the theory of interest groups, the transfer of information between 
groups and policy makers is understood as an important channel of political influence by lobby groups.9 
Communication as one means to express group interests should be the more effective, the more representatives a 
lobby employs. With respect to market concentration, the average sectoral Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
employed as a standard measure.10 To represent international trade issues we use Armington elasticities of 
substitution between imports and competing domestic goods. Intensities for electricity, gas, fuel oil, and total 
energy are employed as independent variable because a central design feature of Germany’s green tax reform has 
been to relieve the burden on energy-intensive sectors by granting generous tax breaks. Here, we use 
logarithmized variables in order to reflect that the tax rate reductions for firms are granted already from rather 
low levels of energy use onwards, i.e., differences in tax burdens between sectors with lower energy-intensity 
should be stronger than between energy-intensive industries.11 The incorporation of the sectoral employment 
level as an independent variable allows us to investigate the burdens induced on sectors with a large working 
force, as German industries generally opposed the reform by threatening with potential layoffs and the recycling 
of the energy tax revenues leads to a reduction in labor costs. Price elasticities of fuel demand (distinguished by 
fuel types) are introduced in order to test predictions of our theoretical model, where energy demand elasticities 
played a crucial role for the environmental tax design. 
 
In our regression analysis on the determinants of green tax differentiation, we start from a central model 
specification which we extend subsequently to cover additional political-economy aspects. Thereby, the isolated 
effects of distinct determinants in each specification can be analyzed. We employ the standard multiple linear 
regression model, where, for each regression specification, sY  denotes the dependent variable with s  sectoral 
observations, isX  refer to the independent variables with associated coefficients iβ , and se is a disturbance 
term:  
 
snsnsss eXXXY +++++= ββββ ...22110     (13) 
                                                 
9  See Grossman and Helpman (2001), Naedval and Brazee (2000) and Potters and van Winden (1992) 
10 In general the HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the respective 
market/sector and summing up the resulting numbers. 
11 The discrete negative relationship between energy intensity and the tax rate at the firm level can be transferred 
to a continuous logarithmic relationship at the sectoral level, where energy intensities and tax rates of 
individual firms are aggregated. 
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Coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors and have been 
standardized (so-called Beta coefficients). 
 
3.2 Basic determinants of taxation and the role of lobbying 
In the specification of our basic regression model, the average effective tax rates on electricity, gas, and fuel oil 
as well as the sector’s net burden are explained at the sectoral level by four independent variables:12 energy 
intensities, employment level, price elasticities of energy demand and lobbying power. Table 5 shows the 
estimation results for coefficients of the basic regression specification (specification 1), as well as the goodness 
of fit for each equation.13 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimation of the basic regression specification (specification 1) 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
ELE_TAX GAS_TAX OIL_TAX NETB 
logELE_INT -0.534 *** (-2.96)    
logGAS_INT  -0.47 ***  (-2.90)   
logOIL_INT   0.255 * (1.73)  
logEN_INT    0.118 (1.44) 
EMPL 0.277 * (1.77) 
0.249 
 (1.44) 
0.500 *** 
(2.90) 
-0.834 *** 
(-7.31) 
E_ELE -0.073 (-0.78)    
E_GAS  -0.002 (-0.02)   
E_OIL   -0.239 * (-1.97)  
E_FUEL    0.032 (0.35) 
LOBBY -0.180 (-1.63) 
-0.256 ** 
(-2.26) 
-0.367 *** 
(-2.92) 
0.032 
(0.16) 
Constant 3.400 * (1.92) 
0.451 *** 
(2.74) 
9.220 *** 
(4.96) 
9.891 
(0.36) 
Goodness of fit R2 = 0.53 R2 = 0.37 R2 = 0.29 R2 = 0.78 
 
Z-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***) means the null hypothesis that the respective parameter is zero can be 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-tailed test). 
 
                                                 
12 The net burden is defined as the difference between overall tax payments and reimbursements in terms 
reduced social security contributions by employers. 
13 In the table, each column represents one regression equation, non-empty cells showing coefficients of the 
respective explanatory variables. 
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We observe highly significant negative coefficients of the logarithmized electricity and gas intensity in the 
respective tax rate regressions: According to our data set, the more energy-intensive sectors face a lower 
effective electricity and gas tax rate. The logarithmic specification implies that in absolute terms this effect is 
weaker for higher intensities, i.e., differences in effective tax rates between sectors with lower energy-intensity 
are larger than those between energy-intensive sectors. The green tax reform thus discriminates in favor of 
energy-intensive sectors – a result that is consistent with the tax break regulations at the firm level.14  
The effects of the employment level on tax rates for electricity and oil are (weakly and highly) significant and 
positive: Our data suggest that sectors with a larger working force bear higher energy tax rates. At first glance, 
this result seems contradictory to the stated labor market goals of Germany’s green tax reform. However, if we 
additionally account for the net burden induced by the reform as a dependent variable, we find the expected 
highly significant negative effect of employment on the net reform burden. Labor-intensive sectors thus in total 
benefit from the reform, i.e. the reimbursements of the energy tax yield more than compensate their energy tax 
payments.  
The price elasticity of oil demand has a significantly negative impact on the oil tax rate. This result provides 
(weak) empirical evidence for our theoretical prediction that − ceteris paribus − sectors with inelastic energy 
demand will be burdened with a high energy tax rate. The coefficients of the oil and gas demand elasticities, 
however, are not significant.  
As a central result, we find a significantly negative impact of the number of lobby employees on the tax rate for 
gas and oil. We conclude that industries represented by stronger associations – in terms of political 
communication – are able to lobby for lower energy tax rates. This finding is not only in line with Grossman and 
Helpman (2001) and Potters and van Winden (1992), but underpins our theoretical analysis of section 2, where 
we found that more effective lobbying results in a reduced tax rate and that differentiated taxes are driven by 
lobby activities.15 
 
 
3.3 The interaction between energy demand elasticities and lobbying  
The theoretical analysis of section 2 indicates that the effects of lobbying should be more pronounced in sectors 
with inelastic energy use, as they would be burdened with a high energy tax when lacking lobby power and the 
benefits of reduced tax rates are relatively high. We can investigate the theoretical assertion by introducing an 
interaction term as the ratio between the number of lobby representatives and the price elasticity of fuel demand. 
As we simply add the interaction term to our basic regression specification 1, the coefficient of the variable 
LOBBY becomes insignificant in the gas tax and less significant in the oil tax regression.16 However, these 
results may emerge due to technical reasons: We observe a strong correlation between the explanatory variable 
LOBBY and the respective interaction terms (see Table 6), especially for electricity and oil demand elasticities. 
                                                 
14 The positive coefficient of the logarithmized oil intensity is not discussed here, since its weak level of 
significance is low compared to the negative electricity and gas intensity coefficients.  
15 Again note that a potential endogeneity problem of lobby formation should be reduced by our choice of years 
– lobby employees (1995) and tax rates (1999).  
16 The whole set of econometric estimations as well as the dataset can be obtained on request from the authors. 
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As a consequence, we observe a problem of multicollinearity which − via larger standard errors − may explain 
the mentioned insignificant coefficient estimates.  
 
 
Table 6: Correlation coefficients between LOBBY and respective interaction terms  
 
 LOBBY_EELE LOBBY_EGAS LOBBY_EOIL 
LOBBY 0.966 -0.367 0.727 
 
The multicollinearity problem can be addressed by dropping one of the intercorrelated variables. Since we are 
interested in the joint effect of LOBBY and energy demand elasticities on the respective tax rates, we drop the 
variable LOBBY, yielding specification 2. Estimation results are presented in Table 7.  
 
 
Table 7: Parameter estimation of the extended regression specification including interaction term between lobby 
power and energy demand elasticity (specification 2) 
  
Dependent  
variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
ELE_TAX GAS_TAX OIL_TAX 
logELE_INT -0.535 *** (-3.02)    
  
logGAS_INT  -0.478 *** (-2.75)    
 
logOIL_INT   0.237 * (1.85)    
EMPL 0.278 * (1.81)    
0.161 
(0.95)    
0.403 *** 
(2.76)    
E_ELE -0.099 (-1.05)    
  
E_GAS  0.011 (0.10)    
 
E_OIL   -0.463 *** (-3.63)    
LOBBY_EELE -0.190 * (-1.69)    
  
LOBBY_EGAS  0.084 (0.85)    
 
LOBBY_EOIL   -0.489 *** (-4.60)    
Constant 3.661 **  (2.05)      
0.371 ** 
(2.34)       
12.385 *** 
(6.21)      
Goodness of fit 0.53 0.32 0.34 
 
Z-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***) means the null hypothesis that the respective parameter is zero can be 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-tailed test). 
 
The coefficient estimates underline our previous results with respect to energy intensities, employment and fuel 
demand elasticities on the tax rate. Moreover, we find support for our theoretical findings regarding the lobbying 
effects for sectors with highly inelastic energy demand: For the electricity and oil tax regression, the coefficients 
of the interaction term between lobby representatives and fuel demand elasticities are negative and (weakly and 
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highly) significant. Since the value of the interaction term increases when lobby power increases and the 
absolute elasticity values decrease, we find that sectors that have high lobbying power and inelastic energy use 
are taxed at a lower rate. This result is especially interesting when we look at the highly significant negative 
impact of the price elasticity of oil demand on the tax rate: Although sectors with price-inelastic oil demand 
ceteris paribus face higher tax rates, these sectors receive lower fuel oil taxes when featuring a great number of 
lobby representatives.  
The straightforward interpretation is that sectors are able to achieve lower tax rates as long as they are 
represented by a powerful lobby which can argue with inelastic energy use. Seeking for strong political 
representation is worthwhile for sectors that are relatively dependent on energy use – a more powerful lobby 
amplifies the concerns of energy dependent industries vis-à-vis the policymakers.  
In the following regression specifications, we will again concentrate on the variable LOBBY rather than the 
interaction term in order to combine the LOBBY regressor with alternative policy-relevant variables and analyze 
the respective interactions.  
 
 
3.4 The role of market concentration 
The following regression specification extends the basic specification in order to analyze the implications of 
market concentration for environmental tax differentiation across sectors. More concentrated industries should 
have a higher degree of interest organization (Olson 1965) and should therefore be more able to put forward their 
political positions. Estimating a specification in which the variable CONC is added to the basic specification 
does, however, not show a significant effect of the degree of market concentration on energy tax rates. 
A higher concentration should also enable sectors to better bring forward their arguments against environmental 
taxation since the tax incidence is concentrated on a smaller number of businesses. In the political debate, one 
argument of firms opposing an environmental tax reform is the threat of potential production losses and their 
economic consequences which most commonly means layoffs of workers. The following regression specification 
extends specification 1 by market concentration as well as an interaction term between concentration and 
employment in order to investigate how the effect of market concentration on tax rates depends on the sectoral 
labor force as a politically relevant factor. Estimation results of the regression specification (specification 3) can 
be found in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Parameter estimation of the extended regression specification including market concentration and 
interaction term between concentration and employment (specification 3) 
 
Dependent  
variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
ELE_TAX GAS_TAX OIL_TAX 
logELE_INT -0.606 ** (-2.54)    
logGAS_INT  -0.388 * (-1.74)     
logOIL_INT   -0.040 (-0.32)    
EMPL 0.459 *** (4.00)    
0.703 *** 
(3.46)    
0.925 *** 
(4.25)    
E_ELE -0.020  (-0.19)      
E_GAS  -0.008 (-0.05)     
E_OIL   -0.266 ** (-2.12)    
LOBBY -0.245 ** (-2.45)    
-0.413 *** 
(-4.23)    
-0.568 *** 
(-4.89)    
CONC -0.038 (-0.34)    
.0896 
(0.36)    
-0.057 
(-0.29)    
CONC_EMPL -0.203 *** (-2.83)    
-0.416 *** 
(-3.10)    
-0.437 *** 
(-3.09)    
Constant 2.505       (1.26)    
0.443 * 
(1.85)    
10.385 *** 
(4.30)     
Goodness of fit R2 = 0.77 R2 = 0.61 R2 = 0.56 
 
Z-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***) means the null hypothesis that the respective parameter is zero can be 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-tailed test). 
 
The results confirm the effects of energy intensities and demand elasticities on tax rates as derived in the 
previous regression specifications. Furthermore, the coefficients of employment (lobby employees) are now 
highly significant in all three (two of the three) regression equations. While coefficients of the variable CONC 
are again insignificant, the highly significant negative effect of CONC_EMPL on all three energy tax rates 
suggests that more concentrated sectors which at the same time employ a larger labor force are able to enforce 
lower effective tax rates, thereby reducing their specific tax incidence.  
Our findings regarding the role of market concentration point to an interesting effect of interest group 
organization: A higher concentration of sectors only leads to political influence if linked to policy-relevant 
arguments – here: potential layoffs of workers.  
 
3.5 The role of international competition 
In the following specification we introduce sector-specific elasticities of substitution between domestic goods 
and competing imports (so-called Armington elasticities) as additional explanatory variable in order to 
investigate the impact of international trade exposure on environmental tax differentiation. Unilateral 
environmental (energy) taxation increases the price of domestic energy-intensive goods, which leads to decline 
in domestic production as untaxed competing imports become relatively cheaper. The higher the Armington 
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elasticities are, the stronger is − ceteris paribus − this substitution effect. Thus, Armington elasticities may also 
serve as an indirect measure for the relocation of domestic production facilities abroad. In policy practice, 
relocation is a wide-spread argument of energy- and trade-intensive industries to claim exemption from 
unilateral environmental taxation (Böhringer and Rutherford 1997).  
In order to analyze the implications of international exposure for Germany’s environmental tax design, we 
extend the previous regression specification (specification 3) by sectoral Armington elasticities. The estimation 
results do, however, not provide a significant effect of the variable E_ARM. We therefore can not argue based on 
the current data set that sectoral exposure to international trade flows is on its own a significant determinant of 
environmental taxation. Moreover, the lobby power coefficients are no longer significant in this specification. At 
second glance, however, these results may emerge due to technical reasons: We observe a strong positive 
correlation between the explanatory variables LOBBY and E_ARM (see Table 9): Sectors that are more exposed 
to international trade are represented by a more powerful industrial association. In comparison, other regressors 
involved in interaction terms by far do not exhibit such strong intercorrelations. As a consequence, we observe 
again a problem of multicollinearity which may explain the mentioned insignificant coefficient estimates.  
 
Table 9: Correlation coefficients between interacting variables  
 
 EMPL E_ELE E_GAS E_OIL E_ARM 
CONC -0.282     
LOBBY  -0.050 -0.062 -0.140 0.721 
 
 
In order to assess if international trade exposure becomes relevant for the environmental tax design in the context 
of lobbying activity, the following regression specification adds to the above specification an interaction effect 
between lobby power and the sectoral Armington elasticity. The problem of multicollinearity is considered by 
dropping the intercorrelated explanatory variables LOBBY and E_ARM, which are then substituted by the 
corresponding interaction term (yielding specification 4).17 The estimation results are in line with previous 
findings regarding the effects of energy intensities and employment on the respective tax rates, although here 
significances are lower (see Table 10). Our regressions now indicate a highly significant negative impact of 
LOBBY_EARM on all three tax rates: Industries that are trade exposed (i.e. exhibit higher Armington elasticities) 
and at the same time have strong lobby power are taxed at a lower rate. These results emphasize the political-
economy role of international competitiveness in environmental tax differentiation and are consistent with the 
                                                 
17 To assure that the goodness of fit has not significantly worsened through the exclusion of two explanatory 
variables (being replaced by one interaction term) we employ the F-test of the difference of R2 between the 
original model and model 3. For the electricity, gas and oil tax regression we find an insignificant F statistic of 
-0.51, 1.44 and 1.51, respectively, with 1 and 21 degrees of freedom. The replacement of LOBBY and E_ARM 
by the interaction term therefore has not significantly downgraded the goodness of fit. 
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conclusion of specification 3: Although trade exposure stand-alone is not considered in the tax design, it 
becomes relevant when lobby groups put it on the political agenda.18 
 
Table 10: Parameter estimation of the extended regression specification including interaction term between 
lobby power and Armington elasticity (specification 4)  
 
Dependent  
variable 
Explanatory  
variables 
ELE_TAX GAS_TAX OIL_TAX 
logELE_INT -0.595 *** (-3.06)      
logGAS_INT  -0.445 (-1.66)     
logOIL_INT   -0.106 (-0.55)    
EMPL 0.368 *** (3.59)    
0.554 ** 
(2.54)    
0.781 *** 
(3.77)    
E_ELE -0.064 (-0.65)      
E_GAS  0.033 (0.17)     
E_OIL   -0.241 (-1.70)    
CONC -0.112 (-0.90)    
0.089 
(0.29)    
-0.115 
(-0.45)    
CONC_EMPL 0.062  (0.48)    
-0.135 
(-0.78)    
-0.194 
(-1.03)    
LOBBY_EARM -0.264 *** (-4.13)    
-0.378 *** 
(-3.43)    
-0.532 *** 
(-4.23)    
Constant 2.918    (1.60)    
0.380  
(1.38)    
10.389 ***   
(3.89)    
Goodness of fit R2 = 0.81 R2 = 0.63 R2 = 0.54 
 
Z-statistics in parentheses. * (**, ***) means the null hypothesis that the respective parameter is zero can be 
rejected at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-tailed test). 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzed the differentiation of green taxes from a political-economy perspective. Using both a 
theoretical model and empirical analysis, we studied a revenue-neutral tax reform which links the introduction of 
ecological taxes with reductions of labor costs. 
While previous studies have found only a limited rationale of differentiated taxes based on efficiency grounds, 
our model predicts substantial effects of lobbying in particular for sectors with highly inelastic energy use: On 
efficiency grounds, such sectors would be assigned high taxes as they are less distortionary than those in other 
                                                 
18 Note that this is in line with findings in the literature (i.e. Böhringer and Rutherford 2002) that pure efficiency 
arguments can hardly justify a strong differentiation of taxes. Our analysis indicates that it is indeed political 
pressure which is a significant driving force of tax differentiation. 
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sectors. The resulting high costs from taxation, however, lead to high lobbying incentives which in turn can 
translate into substantially reduced taxes. We used data on the German Ecological Tax Reform to put our 
predictions to a test. 
The regression analysis showed that environmental tax differentiation is consistent with political-economy 
reasoning. Both economic characteristics of industries and political interests determine the design of the tax 
scheme. The reform clearly discriminated in favor of energy-intensive industries by integrating a number of 
special regulations. Consistent with our model, the central finding of the regression analysis is that for all energy 
tax components, industries represented by more powerful associations (in terms of the number of lobby 
representatives) are better able to communicate their interests and enforce lower tax rates.  
We found evidence that the effectiveness of interest groups depends not only on the number lobby 
representatives, but also on market concentration and energy demand elasticities. In particular, lobby activity is 
more successful if the interest groups can use convincing arguments based on energy dependence and potential 
losses in labor force, as well as international competitition. Those arguments alone, however, do generally not 
induce a large differentiation of taxes. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that the tax reform discriminated in favor of energy-intensive industries while 
sectors with high employment levels were taxed more heavily. Regarding their net burden, such labor-intensive 
sectors benefit from the reform due to reimbursements. Both our model and the empirical analysis therefore 
indicate one major benefit from using a revenue-neutral reform: although lobbying activities are generally 
targeted at lower individual tax rates and thereby lead to tax differentiation, sectors benefit from the higher taxes 
of other sectors and therefore have incentives to counter attempts of those to water down the tax rates. 
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6 Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: Listing of German manufacturing sectors (Input-output classification) 
 
Sector No. IOT 1993 Name of sector 
1 Agricultural products 
2 Forestry & fishery products 
3 Electric power & steam & warm water 
4 Gas 
5 Water (distribution) 
6 Coal & coal products 
7 Minery products (without coal & gas & petroleum) 
8 Crude oil & natural gas 
9 Chemical products & nuclear fuels 
10 Oil products 
11 Plastics 
12 Rubber    
13 Stone & lime & cement 
14 Ceramic 
15 Glass 
16 Iron & steel 
17 Non-ferrous metals 
18 Casting products 
19 Rolling products 
20 Production of steel etc 
21 Mechanical engineering 
22 Office machines 
23 Motor vehicles 
24 Shipbuilding 
25 Aerospace equipment 
26 Electrical engineering 
27 Engineers' small tools 
28 Metal and steel goods 
29 Music instruments & toys etc 
30 Timber  
31 Furniture 
32 Paper & pulp & board 
33 Paper & board products 
34 Printing and publishing 
35 Leathers & footwear 
36 Textiles 
37 Clothing 
38 Food products 
39 Beverages 
40 Tobacco products 
41 Building & construction 
42 Recovery & repair 
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Table 2: Description of regression variables 
 
Variable Description 
ELE_TAX Electricity tax rate (€ / MWh) 
GAS_TAX Gas tax rate (€/MWh) 
OIL_TAX Fuel oil tax rate (€ / 1000l) 
NETB Net burden (m €) 
ELE_INT Electricity intensity (GWh / €) 
GAS_INT Gas intensity (GWh/€) 
OIL_INT Fuel oil intensity (1000l / €) 
EN_INT Total energy intensity (GWh / €) 
logELE_INT Natural logarithm of ELE_INT 
logGAS_INT Natural logarithm of GAS_INT 
logOIL_INT Natural logarithm of OIL_INT 
logEN_INT Natural logarithm of EN_INT 
EMPL Employment (1000) 
E_ELE Price elasticity of electricity demand (absolute value) 
E_GAS Price elasticity of gas demand (absolute value) 
E_OIL Price elasticity of fuel oil demand (absolute value) 
E_FUEL Price elasticity of total fuel demand (absolute value) 
LOBBY Total number of lobby representatives per sector 
LOBBY_EELE Interaction term (LOBBY / E_ELE) 
LOBBY_EGAS Interaction term (LOBBY / E_GAS) 
LOBBY_EOIL Interaction term (LOBBY / E_OIL) 
CONC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI (x 1000) 
CONC_EMPL Interaction term (CONC * EMPL) 
E_ARM Armington Elasticity between imports and domestic goods 
LOBBY_EARM Interaction term (LOBBY * E_ARM) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics for regression variables 
 
VARIABLE OBSERV. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN. MAX. 
ELE_TAX 42 5.57 3.83 1.31 19.91 
GAS_TAX 42 0.61 0.31 0.32 1.61 
OIL_TAX 42 7.73 3.82 4.05 20.19 
NETB 42 -30.36 68.49 -278.16 68.97 
ELE_INT 42 0.29 0.34 0.00 1.63 
GAS_INT 42 0.47 0.74 0.00 3.23 
OIL_INT 42 5.16 5.11 0.08 29.29 
EN_INT 42 0.82 0.95 0.03 4.27 
EMPL 42 294.36 380.97 9.00 1709.00 
E_ELE 42 0.26      0.09        0.19        0.39 
E_GAS 42 0.62     0.15          0.10        0.82 
E_OIL 42 0.58    0.18        0.10        0.89 
E_FUEL 42 0.46     0.13        0.16        0.69 
LOBBY 42 49.50 67.09 0.00 350.00 
CONC 36 62.87 84.63 2.80 357.65 
E_ARM 35 0.69 0.48 0.08 2.36 
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Table 4: German manufacturing sectors and respective industrial associations 
 
Sector No. Name of sector Industrial associations 
1 Agricultural products German Farmers Association (DBV) 
2 Forestry & fishery products German Forestry Council (DFWR) German Fishery Association (DFV) 
3 Electric power & steam & warm water German Electricity Association (VDEW) 
4 Gas Association of the German Gas and Water Industries (BGW) 
5 Water (distribution) Association of the German Gas and Water Industries (BGW) 
6 Coal & coal products 
German Mining Association (WVB) 
German Hard Coal Association (GVST) 
German Lignite Industry Association (DEBRIV) 
7 Minery products (without coal & gas & petroleum) German Mining Association (WVB) 
8 Crude oil & natural gas Association of the German Oil and Gas Producers (WEG) 
9 Chemical products & nuclear fuels Association of the German Chemical Industry (VCI) 
10 Oil products Association of the German Petroleum Industry (MWV) 
11 Plastics 
Association of the German Plastics Processing Industry (GKV) 
Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) 
Federation of German Paper, Cardboard and Plastics Processing Ind. (HPV) 
12 Rubber German Rubber Manufacturers’ Association (WDK) 
13 Stone & lime & cement German Building Materials Association (BBS) 
14 Ceramic German Federation of  Fine Ceramic Industry (AKI) 
15 Glass German Glass Industry Federation (BV Glas) 
16 Iron & steel German Steel Federation (WV Stahl) German Federation of Steel and Metal Processing (WSM) 
17 Non-ferrous metals Federation of the German Non-Ferrous Metals Industry (WVM) Federation of German Steel and Metal Processing (WSM) 
18 Casting products German Foundry Association (DGV) 
19 Rolling products Association of German Drawing Mills (STV) Association of German Cold Rolling Mills (FVK) 
20 Production of steel etc German Structural Steel and Power Engineering Association (SET) 
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Table 4 (continued): German manufacturing sectors and respective industrial associations  
 
Sector No. Name of sector Industrial associations 
21 Mechanical engineering Federation of the German Engineering Industry (VDMA) 
22 Office machines – 
23 Motor vehicles Association of the German Automotive Industry (VDA) 
24 Shipbuilding German Shipbuilding and Ocean Industries Association (VSM) 
25 Aerospace equipment German Aerospace Industries Association (BDLI) 
26 Electrical engineering German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association (ZVEI) 
27 Engineers' small tools German Industrial Association for Optical, Medical and Mechatronical Technologies (SPECTARIS) Federation of German Jewellery, Watches, Clocks, Silverware and Related Industries 
28 Metal and steel goods – 
29 Music instruments & toys etc. National Association of German Musical Instruments Manufacturers (BDMH) German Association of the Toy Industry (DVSI) 
30 Timber Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) Association of the German Sawmill and Wood Industry (VDS) 
31 Furniture Federation of German Woodworking and Furniture Industries (HDH) 
32 Paper & pulp & board German Pulp and Paper Association (VDP) 
33 Paper & board products German Pulp and Paper Association (VDP) Federation of German Paper, Cardboard and Plastics Processing Industry (HPV) 
34 Printing and publishing German Printing Industry Federation (BVDM) 
35 Leathers & footwear German Leather Federation (VDL) Federation of the German Shoe Industry (HDS) 
36 Textiles Federation of German Textile and Fashion Industry 
37 Clothing Federation of the German Clothing Industry (BBI) 
38 Food products Federation of the German Food and Drink Industries (BVE) 
39 Beverages Federation of the German Food and Drink Industries (BVE) 
40 Tobacco products Federation of the German Cigarette Industry (VdC) 
41 Building & construction German Construction Industry Federation (HDB) 
42 Recovery & repair German Construction Industry Federation (HDB) 
 
